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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4595
Referring to the original context of Dutch Disease, 
the term refers to the fears of de-industrialization that 
gripped the Netherlands as a result of the appreciation 
of the Dutch currency that followed the discovery of 
natural gas deposits. Expansion of petroleum exports in 
the 1960s not only crowded out other exports, it actually 
reduced other exports disproportionately and fueled the 
fears of dire consequences for Dutch manufacturing.
   In the case of Equatorial Guinea, the secondary sector 
represents about 2 percent of the gross domestic product, 
manufacturing represents less than 1 percent, and oil 
represents more than 95 percent. The negative impact 
of the Dutch Disease in this context would be limited 
given the structure of the economy and on the contrary 
may even be a good thing because it fuels the structural 
transformational process of the economy, which is needed 
in Equatorial Guinea. This paper argues that the ongoing 
This  paper—Poverty  Reduction  and  Economic  Management  Division,  Africa  Region,  Economic  Management 
Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to help African Countries, manage and transform their natural 
resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads the benefits more fairly among their people for an effective 
poverty reduction. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at Atotosame@worldbank.org.  
Dutch Disease is a natural and necessary reallocation of 
resources in the economy of Equatorial Guinea.
   The magnitude of negative macroeconomic 
consequences of the Dutch Disease depends on the 
country’s economic structure and stage of development. 
In a country where the manufacturing sector barely 
exists or where the non-oil primary sector is structurally 
deficient, as has been the case of Equatorial Guinea, 
there is little to fear about the disease. The oil boom 
is a blessing, given that oil revenues when properly 
managed can play a special and critical role in overall 
economic development and poverty reduction in low-
income countries. To promote good governance in the 
management of the country’s oil wealth, the government 
may wish to adhere to clear standards of accountability 
and transparency; especially by complying with the 
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 Equatorial  Guinea
1 is a tiny country of 28,000 km
2 with a relatively small 
population estimated at about 506,000 inhabitants
2 and consists of several geographically 
distinct areas. Rio Muni, the mainland region, accounts for approximately 85 percent of 
the land area and 80 percent of the total population. The rest of the country includes the 
island of Bioko, which is the site of the capital city, Malabo, and five additional small 
islands in the Gulf of Guinea. Oil production began in 1992, with a production of 6,000 
barrels a day, when an independent oil company, Walter International, started operations 
in the Alba field, situated 36 kilometers off the coast of Bioko; the larger Zafiro field, 
operated by Mobil Oil, came on stream in August 1996. Petroleum output average 83,000 
barrels per day in 1988 representing more than 60 percent of GDP and reached a 
milestone of 400,000 barrels a day in 2005, about 90 percent of GDP. 
 
  Since Adam Smith and David Ricardo there has been a belief that natural 
resources are “a blessing”; therefore, countries richly endowed with natural resources 
have an advantage over countries that are not. Natural resource endowments have helped 
many countries (Norway, Malaysia, Botswana, Finland and Indonesia) to grow and 
diversify, in part by providing a basis for developing associated technologies and capital 
goods industries. 
 
  The abundance of natural resources also carries a paradox that has inspired 
innumerable studies of mineral-rich countries in the developing world. Since the 1970s 
they have consistently underperformed their mineral-poor counterparts on a variety of 
economic performance, good governance and income equality (Eifert, Gelb and Nils 
2002); (Gelb1998); (Sachs and Warner 1997); (Auty 1998, 2001): this phenomenon has 
come to be known as the resource curse. The “resource curse” is the phenomena whereby 
a country with an export-driven, natural resources sector, generating large revenues for 
government, leads paradoxically to economic stagnation and political instability. There is 
considerable evidence that non-renewable natural resource revenues, especially windfall 
can, if not properly managed, adversely affect economic growth and poverty reduction. 
 
  The large-scale production of hydrocarbon in Equatorial Guinea has set the stage 
for a significant and dynamic structural transformation of its economy. The objective of 
this paper is to propose a medium and long-term strategy for managing the country’s 
rapidly rising oil wealth; ensure that the large oil endowment relatively to the size of the 
population is being translated into economic opportunities and benefices for the overall 
economy. We also argue in this paper that the ongoing Dutch Disease is a natural and 




                                                 
1I am grateful to Rafael Munoz Moreno for his comments and suggestions; nevertheless, I am responsible 
for all errors or misunderstandings the document might contain.    
2World Development Indicator Report (WDI) - The World Bank 2005.  II.  Country Background until the Onset of Oil 
  
  Equatorial Guinea is facing an amazing challenge in the short-term which is 
striving for an efficient management of oil wealth for a sustained poverty reduction. The 
GoEG needs to address the public finance management (PFM) weaknesses and 
governance if the country is to take advantage of its unique opportunity to use the 
nonrenewable oil wealth to foster economic structural transformation and achieve 
sustained broad-based growth and poverty reduction. The government also needs to 
strengthen and pursue a disciplined fiscal policy, make efficient use of oil revenue, 
implement a genuine budgetary control over expenditure commitments while providing 
provisions for priority sectors critical for the development process and poverty reduction 
(education, health and infrastructure).  
A - Country Economic and Political Development Background 
until 1982 
 
  During the 11 years following Equatorial Guinea’s independence, the country was 
dominated by a dictatorship which devastated the economy and impoverished the 
population
3. The economy was based almost exclusively on agriculture, fishing and 
forestry, accounting for 50 percent of GDP, about 97 percent of exports and the principal 
sources of income for about 80 percent of the population. Although well endowed with 
natural resources, Equatorial Guinea was characterized by a very weak public 
administration and a shortage of labor. In the 1970s, the economy was mismanaged, 
public administration ceased to function and the population survived at a barely 
subsistence level. A large part of the educated population was killed, approximately one-
third of the population fled the country, and the formal education system ceased to 
function for about six or seven years (World Bank 1983a).  
 
  Cocoa, coffee and timber have traditionally been the country’s main source of 
incomes. During the early period of independence, Equatorial Guinea experienced a 
drastic economic decline; GDP per capita in current terms fell sharply, from US$ 260 in 
1970 to about US$ 170 in 1979, mainly because of the severe decline of the country’s 
agricultural production. Cocoa exports fell from nearly 40,000 tons in 1968 to less than 
20,000 tons at the beginning of the 1970s, following the departure of the foreign 
plantation owners and to about 7,000 tons a year after the exodus of some 30,000-40,000 
Nigerian contract workers in the mid-1970s.  
 
In an attempt to restore cocoa production, the government nationalized most 
plantations, introduced mandatory labor, and brought large numbers of people from the 
countryside to work on the state-owned plantations. However, poor public sector 
management, the inadequate and unmotivated labor supply, and reduced application of 
insecticides and fungicides led to a further decline in yields and in area cultivated. 
                                                 
3 Equatorial Guinea. An Introductory Economic Report – The World Bank, June 1983.  
  4Exports
4 fell to a record low of 5,200 tons in 1980. When the government started seizing 
harvests without payment, cash crops were almost completely abandoned and barter trade 
became the dominant form of exchange. 
 
  Declines in the other agricultural sectors were equally striking; timber production 
declined from 360,000 cubic meters in 1968 to an annual average of 6,000 cubic meters 
in the late 1970s, and coffee and palm-oil production virtually disappeared. Basic 
services in health, education, water and electrical supplies could not be maintained; 
foreign investment literally stopped, and the trading system, operated by state enterprises, 
broke down.  
 
Equatorial Guinea: Composition of Exports in 








































       
                    Source: Equatoguinean authorities and World Bank. 
 
  The devastation of Equatorial Guinea’s economy in the 1970s was accompanied 
by the complete disarray of its public finances. Public financial transactions were 
recorded only sporadically, and the accounts of the Treasury, the Bank of Equatorial 
Guinea - the former Central Bank – and public enterprises were not kept separately
5. In 
August 1979, a military junta overthrew the dictatorship regime, led by Macias Nguema 
and established a new government, Presided by Lt. Col. Obiang Nguema Mbasoro and 
which then began to rebuild the economy and social institutions.  
 
  The new government reintroduced regular budgetary and banking procedures with 
technical assistance from IMF, and in April 1980, the first formal budget since 1974 was 
enacted followed by a stabilization program, agreed upon with the IMF, aimed at 
establishing financial discipline. During the first years of its rule, the government 
concentrated on returning the country to political stability, re-establishing the legal and 
administrative framework needed to support the economic reconstruction process, and 
attracting and coordinating the expected foreign aid. Rebuilding ministries and public 
agencies has been a difficult and a slow process though. 
                                                 
4 The World Bank - Technical Assistance Project – Republic of Equatorial Guinea - May 1984.  
5 The World Bank – Report No P-4288 – EG, April 1986. 
  5B - Equatorial Guinea’s Economic Management until the Onset of 
Oil (1982 - 1995) 
 
  The Government of Equatorial Guinea was confronted with two equally important 
issues which are: (i) to create favorable conditions for raising food and cash crop 
production and increasing exports, and (ii) to rebuild the public administration and social 
institutions needed to support the country’s reconstruction.  
 









































          Source: Equatoguinean authorities and World Bank 
 
  Private sector involvement was slow and hesitant in the reconstruction process 
given the shortage of local entrepreneurs and the weakness and inconvertibility of the 
domestic currency. In that context, most economic activities remained under 
governmental control. The rehabilitation of the cocoa sector was slow because both 
domestic and foreign labor showed little interest in working there, because of the 
combination of the experience with forced labor under the former regime and inadequate 
economic incentives.  
 
  In an effort to attract foreign aid, the government presented a three year 
reconstruction program 1982-1984 to an International Donor conference in April 1982. 
The program identified agriculture and infrastructure as the main development priorities, 
and several donors expressed interest in financing projects. In addition, given the weak 
public administration and the limited capacity, the government decided to transfer 
responsibilities for some key sectors - petroleum and forestry - of the economy from the 
Ministries concerned to the presidency in order to centralize the decision-making process, 
minimize coordination problems, and to efficiently allocate the limited existing skills. 
This new economic program was not sustained.  
 
  In 1985, Equatorial Guinea became a member of the Bank of Central African 
States (BEAC). Efforts to rebuild the economy were renewed, but overall growth was 
marginal; although timber production increased appreciably and activity in the commerce 
and trade sectors expanded, the production and export of cocoa, the country’s main 
foreign exchange earning, stagnated far below levels achieved before independence and 
  6  7
                                                
worsening terms of trade contributed to large and unsustainable fiscal and external 
imbalance. 
 
  In 1988, the government adopted its first medium-term adjustment program 
covering the period 1988-1991. This program was supported by: (i) a first annual 
arrangement under the IMF’s structural adjustment facility (SAF); (ii) a rehabilitation 
import credit (RIC) and sectoral loans from IDA; and, (iii) assistance from other 
international and bilateral donors. However, during 1988-1989, economic performance 
fell short of what had been envisaged under the adjustment program. Many of the 
program’s objectives were not met owing to slippage in policy implementation, caused in 
part by limited administration capacity and by the continued erosion in world market 
prices of cocoa and coffee. After having grown by about 2.5% in 1986-1997, real GDP 
growth slowed to an average of less than 2% in 1988-1989, as production and exports of 
timber and cocoa declined. 
 
  In 1990 -1991, the government took a number of important steps to bring the 
structural adjustment program back on track. The reforms consisted mainly of efforts to 
diversify economic activity and to strengthen the production sectors, especially by (i) 
launching in October 1990, of a IDA-financed project to diversify agriculture in favor of 
food crops and non-traditional exports; (ii) the adoption of forestry action plan aimed at 
revitalizing production and exports, while strengthening the management and 
conservation of the country’s natural resources and more notably; (iii) the signing, in 
April 1990, of a new contract with a foreign company to start the exploitation of the 
country’s oil resources. 
 
  Export of oil started in April 1992 with petroleum production
6 estimated at 6,000 
barrels per day in 1992. According to the terms of oil contract, total oil revenues accruing 
to the government from 1992 to 1994 was to be about US$10 millions. Oil revenues were 
expected to increase substantially afterwards, especially from 1996 when profit sharing 
was to start and the government was set to receive some US$60 to 90 million, on a 
cumulative basis, during the period 1995-2000.  
 
 
6 Republic of Equatorial Guinea - Second Petroleum Technical Assistance Project - The World Bank, June 
1992.  III. Recent  Economic  Developments 
 
  Equatorial Guinea’s economic developments
7 in the 1990s were dominated by the 
coming on stream of important oil fields in 1996; breaking with a long period of 
economic stagnation, real GDP growth
8 averaged 8.5 percent a year in 1992-1995, rose 
to 29 percent in 1996 and 71 percent in 1997 and was about 38.8 percent in 1999. Non-oil 
GDP grew by 10.3 percent on average in 1994-97 but remained flat in 1998 because of a 
downturn in timber output. Following the initial surge in prices in the wake of the 
devaluation
9, inflation fell to 4.5 percent in 1996 on a year-end basis and 3.7% in 1997. 
Due to the development of the important Zafiro offshore oil field, investment rebounded, 
averaging 79 percent of GDP in 1994-98, while the national savings rate remained at 11 
percent of GDP on average. In this context, the external current account deficit increased 
sharply from 56 percent of GDP to 103.5 percent in 1996 and 82 percent in 1998.  
 
Equatorial Guinea: Oil Production (thousand barrels 
















































               Source: Equatoguinean authorities. 
 
  Equatorial Guinea’s fiscal management has become substantially expansionary 
with primary expenditure rising by 53 percentage points of non-oil GDP between 1994 
and 1998 to 69 percent of non-oil GDP, including large unrecorded extra-budgetary 
expenditure financed through advances made by the oil companies at nonconcessional 
terms. In spite of an increase in government revenue of more than 10 percent points of 
GDP to 28 percent of GDP
10  over the same period, the primary budget balance, 
excluding foreign-financed investment, turned from a surplus of 4.5 percent GDP in 1994 
                                                 
7 The coming on stream of important new oil fields in August 1996 led to a rapid transformation of 
Equatorial Guinea’s economy, with the contribution of oil production to GDP at market prices growing 
from 18 percent in 1994 to 61 percent in 1998. 
8 In percentage change – IMF Staff country report No. 99/113 and No 03/385. 
9 The January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, fueled an upturn in the non-oil sector, led by 
intensification in logging activity that resulted in an unsustainable level of timber output in 1997. 
10 Equatorial Guinea: Recent Economic Developments. IMF Staff Country Report No 99/113, October 
1999. 
  8to a deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP in 1996. Oil revenue was generally higher than 
expected, however primary expenditure also exceeded budgetary allocations by very 
large margin, including large unrecorded extra-budgetary spending. 
 
  Oil revenue increased from below CFAF 2 billion in 1994 about 12 percent of oil 
export proceeds to CFAF 31 billion in 1998 around 13 percent of oil export proceeds. 
The ratio of government oil revenue to oil exports was small, as the production-sharing 
contracts initially signed by Equatorial Guinea were based on model contracts from a 
1981 petroleum law designed to attract investors to an underdeveloped area with 
uncertain oil prospects.  
 
  In 1998, the government succeeded in renegotiating the Mobil contract. The most 
significant changes were (i) an increase in the royalty rate from the initial flat rate of 10 
percent of gross revenues to a sliding scale ranging from 12 percent to 16 percent, (ii) the 
imposition of limits on cost deductions of an annual maximum of 80 percent pf gross 
export proceeds, (iii) a reduction in the uplift rate (margin added to cost carried forward) 
from 30 percent to 19 percent, and (iv) the assignment to the government of 5 percent 
share in equity. The increase in the royalty rate had an immediate positive impact on the 
government oil revenue, which increased to CFAF 53 billion in 1998, about 20 percent of 
oil export proceeds. 
 

































       Source: IMF; Equatoguinean authorities. 
 
 Macroeconomic  developments
11 continued to be dominated by the hydrocarbon 
sector, with oil and gas accounting for about 90 percent of GDP, 98 percent of exports 
and over 90 percent of government revenues. Real GDP grew by about 34 percent in 
2004, driven by the sharp expansion in hydrocarbon production. Non-oil GDP increased 
by about 13 percent, owing to continued strong performance in the construction, 
infrastructure and service sectors simulated by government spending. In 2005 due to a 
slowdown in hydrocarbon production, the overall GDP growth decelerated sharply. Large 
                                                 
11 IMF – Republic of Equatorial Guinea: 2005 and 2006 Article IV Consultations. 
  9public infrastructure investment and private housing construction continued to be the 
main sources of growth in the non-oil GDP. 
 
































           Source: Equatoguinean authorities; and IMF. 
 
  The real effective exchange
12 rate of the CFA franc calculated for Equatorial 
Guinea continued to appreciate during 2005. This pattern largely reflected the 
appreciation vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the persistent large inflation differential with 
the major trading partner countries: in fact these are evidences of Dutch Disease. The 
appreciation of the real exchange rate for Equatorial Guinea was the largest in the 
CEMAC region, reflecting the country’s position as the largest oil exporter and recipient 
of foreign direct investment relative to GDP.  
 























                  Sources:  Equato-Guinean authorities Bank and Fund staff estimates. 
  
The traditional exports stagnated during the last few years; because producers’ 
profits were adversely affected by the nominal appreciation of the CFA franc vis-à-vis 
the U.S. dollar. However, another crucial underlying factor for stagnation in traditional 
                                                 
12 Overall movement in the real effective exchange rate appeared to be dominated by the response to 
favorable terms of trade developments particularly world oil prices and other fundamentals, such as the 
strong overall fiscal position. 
  10exports was the loss of immigrant farm labor
13, which was exacerbated by the 
abandonment of the farms in search of more lucrative employment in the oil and related 
sectors and, the poor yields of aged plantations.  
 
  The traditional export sectors which has always been in difficulty given the 
recurrent shortage of labor, is further affected by the real exchange rate appreciation, 
consequence of favorable terms of trade developments particularly world oil prices and 
other fundamentals, such as the strong overall fiscal position which itself is good for the 
overall economy; given the current structure of Equatorial Guinea economy. The 
appreciation of the real exchange rate is likely to accelerate the shifting of production 
inputs (capital and labor - resource movement effect). The Dutch Disease, by reallocating 
resource may be doing what the government would have been otherwise reluctant to do, 
therefore facilitating the transformational process of the economy.   
 
















































         Source: Equatoguinean authorities and IMF. 
 
  Despite the enormous resources derived from oil exports which have increased 
the per capita GDP from US$ 346 in 1995 to US$ 3391 in 2004, Equatorial Guinea has 
not yet been able to significantly improve living conditions of the majority of the 
population. Sixty-six percent of the population still does not have access to potable water 
and the illiteracy rate stands at 60 percent. Infant mortality is about 97/1,000. The 2005 
UNDP Human Development Index ranked the country 121
st over 177 countries for which 
the index has been calculated. This poor performance reflects the absence of a 
comprehensive development and poverty reduction framework as well as poor human 
resource capacity which impedes the translation of the main policy objectives of the 
government into a set of budget priorities and expenditures. 
 
                                                 
13 Indeed, there is continued shortage of labor in EQG. 
 








































SSA Oil Producing Countries: Overall Fiscal Balance (excluding grants) 


































         Sources: IMF, African Department database, March 2007; and World Economic Outlook 2007. 
  12IV. Understanding  the  Macroeconomic Implications of the Windfalls 
and Development Prospects 
 
  Since Adam Smith and David Ricardo there has been a belief that natural 
resources are “a blessing”; therefore, countries richly endowed with natural resources 
have an advantage over countries that are not. Natural resource endowments have helped 
many countries (Norway, Malaysia, Botswana, Finland and Indonesia) to grow and 
diversify, in part by providing a basis for developing associated technologies and capital 
goods industries. 
 
  The abundance of natural resources also carries a paradox that has inspired 
innumerable studies of mineral-rich countries in the developing world. Since the 1970s 
they have consistently underperformed their mineral-poor counterparts on a variety of 
economic performance, good governance and income equality (Eifert, Gelb and Nils 
2002); (Gelb1998); (Sachs and Warner 1997); (Auty 1998, 2001): this phenomenon has 
come to be known as the resource curse. The “resource curse” is the phenomena whereby 
a country with an export-driven, natural resources sector, generating large revenues for 
government, leads paradoxically to economic stagnation and political instability. There is 
considerable evidence that non-renewable natural resource revenues, especially windfall 
can, if not properly managed, adversely affect economic growth and poverty reduction. 
 
  The weak economic performance and continued poverty in many oil-exporting 
countries, continues to pose a challenge to scholars and development practitioners. The 
abundant literature explaining the poor growth performance in resource-rich-countries
14 
can be divided in two set of issues which are as follows: some focus on the economic 
effects namely Dutch Disease and volatility known as booms and busts (Gelb 1988); 
Rigobon (2003); (Auty 2001) other focus on governance issues (Karl 1970); (Eifert, Gelb 
and Tallroth 2002). Understanding these two features of resource curse is critical for 
Equatorial Guinea if is to make its exceptional oil wealth a blessing rather than a curse.  
 
  The most prevalent cause attributed to poor rates of economic growth in mineral-
rich countries is Dutch Disease; a term originally referring to the problems the 
Netherlands encountered when it discovered huge gas reserves off its northern coast in 
1959. The Netherlands experienced then a vast increase in its wealth after discovering 
large natural gas deposits in the North Sea. Unexpectedly, this sudden ostensibly positive 
development had had serious negative repercussions on important other segment of the 
economy, as the Dutch currency became stronger, hence making Dutch non-oil exports 
less competitive. This adverse impact is known as Dutch Disease. 
 
  The mechanism of a paradox negative impact of a sudden wealth on the economy 
can be described as follows: an economy experiencing an export boom can be divided 
into three sectors which are (i) the booming export sector; (ii) the lagging export sector – 
                                                 
14 Sachs and Warner, 1997 from a sample of 95 developing countries found a clear negative relationship 
between natural resource based exports and growth in the period 1970-90. 
  13traditional exports - as the two traded goods sectors and (iii) the non-traded goods sector, 
which essentially supplies domestic resident and might include retails trade, services and 
construction. In the presence of Dutch Disease, the traditional export sector gets crowded 
out by the other two sectors (Corden and Neary in 1982).   
 
  Generally the windfalls lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate by 
shifting production inputs (capital and labor) to the booming mineral sector and non-
tradable sector (retail trade, service, and construction), thereby reducing the 
competitiveness of the non-booming sector mostly agriculture and manufacturing
15 hence 
participating in their collapse. The shift into non-tradable sector accelerates domestic 
inflation
16, which is responsible for the real exchange rate appreciation. These short-term 
macro-adjustment problems result in long-term effects on growth by reducing the 
country’s economic diversity and increasing its reliance on exports from its natural 
resource sector.  
 
  The phenomenon of Dutch Disease is already affecting the economy of Equatorial 
Guinea
17. The real effective exchange rate for Equatorial Guinea was the largest in the 
FCFA zone oil-exporting countries
18.  However, we argue in this paper that the ongoing 
Dutch Disease is a natural and necessary reallocation of resources within the Equatorial 
Guinea economy, despite the negative impact of real effective exchange rate appreciation 
on Equatorial Guinea’s economy
19. In fact the real effective exchange rate of the CFA 
franc calculated for Equatorial Guinea continued to appreciate during 2005 and 2006. 
This pattern largely reflected the appreciation vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the persistent 
large inflation differential with the major trading partner countries. The appreciation of 
the real exchange rate for Equatorial Guinea was the largest in the CEMAC region, 
reflecting the country’s position as the largest oil exporter and recipient of foreign direct 
investment relative to GDP. 
    
 
                                                 
15 Equatorial Guinea does not have a structured manufacturing sector therefore the real exchange rate 
appreciation makes the imported goods on which the country depends on cheaper.  
16 As the matter of fact, the non-tradable sector supply is inelastic in the short term so, when demand 
expands and resources move into the non-tradable sector, this causes prices to increase thereby induces real 
exchange rate appreciation.  
17 In the sense that, the natural resource boom raises the value of the domestic currency and led to, 
increasing imports and decreasing traditional export sector. 
18 Angola is not part of the FCFA zone currency arrangement. 
19 Having said that it is noteworthy to emphasize that there is no risk of deindustrialization, given the 
structure of Equatorial Guinea Economy; and neither the risk of making manufactured goods less 
competitive simply because the manufacturing sector does barely exist to say the least.  

























































              Source: IMF, African Department database, March 2007. 
 
  The traditional exports stagnated during the last few years; because producers’ 
profits were adversely affected by the nominal appreciation of the CFA franc vis-à-vis 
the U.S. dollar. However, another crucial underlying factor for stagnation in traditional 
exports was the loss of immigrant farm labor
20, which was exacerbated by the 
abandonment of the farms in search of more lucrative employment in the oil and related 
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  The traditional export sector which has often been in difficulty due to the 
recurrent shortage of labor, is obviously further affected by the real effective exchange 
rate appreciation, consequence
21 of favorable terms of trade developments particularly 
world oil prices and other fundamentals, such as the strong overall fiscal position which 
itself is good for the overall economy; given the current structure of Equatorial Guinea 
economy, and the importance of the oil sector and the real effective exchange rate 
appreciation for Equatorial Guinea, the Dutch Disease is likely to accelerate the shifting 
                                                 
20  Indeed, there is continued shortage of labor in EQG. 
21 Among other things; the noticeable persistent large inflation differential with the major trading partner 
countries. 
  15of production inputs (capital and labor - resource movement effect) and therefore 
permanently crowds out the declining
22 traditional export sector by the other two 
booming sectors of the economy. The Dutch Disease, by reallocating resource may be 
doing what the government would have been otherwise reluctant to do, therefore 
facilitating the transformational process of the economy.   
 
  Going back to the original context of Dutch Disease, the term refers to the fears of 
de-industrialization that gripped the Netherlands as a result of the appreciation of the 
Dutch currency that followed the discovery of natural gas deposits. The appreciation of 
the Dutch currency that followed the gas export boom reduced the profitability of 
manufacturing and service exports
23. Total exports decreased markedly to GDP during 
the 1960s. Expansion of petroleum exports in the 1960s not only crowded out other 
exports, actually reduced other exports disproportionately and fueled the fears of dire 
consequences for Dutch manufacturing. 
 
  In principle the Dutch Disease
24 can be seen as a matter of one sector benefiting 
partly at the expense of others therefore not an impediment per se; however the disease is 
potentially harmful if there is something special about the reallocation of resources 
between sectors; for example from high-tech service industries to low primary production 
(Gylfason 2001). The oil boom would therefore induce a decline in a technologically 
leading sector of the economy with adverse consequence for long-term growth: The 
resource shift can then become a true disease (Sachs 2007).  
 
In the case of Equatorial Guinea the secondary sector represents about 2 percent 
of the GDP and the manufacturing almost does not exist; in average from 2000 to 2005 
the manufacturing sector represented less than 1 percent of GDP. The negative impact of 
Dutch Disease in that sense will be limited
25 given the structure of the economy and on 
the contrary may even be a good thing in that context, because it fuels the structural 
transformational process of the economy which was needed in Equatorial Guinea. 
 
                                                 
22 The Traditional export sector has been in difficulties for years even before the coming on stream of 
important oil fields due to structural deficiencies and mostly labor.  
23 Thorvaldur Gylfason. Lessons from the Dutch Disease: Causes, Treatment, and Cures - Institute of 
Economic Studies - University of Iceland. August 2001. 
24 The Dutch disease is a matter of concerns mainly because of its potentially deleterious consequence for 
economic growth. 
25 Apart from the domestic food production: the real exchange rate appreciation has made imported foods 
cheaper hence; has increased the dependency on imported foods to the detriment of domestic food 
production sector. This short-term macro-adjustment consequent can be corrected through increased 
productivity and reallocation of resources in the sector.  






























              Sources:  Equato-Guinean authorities Bank and Fund staff estimates. 
 
  The magnitude of negative macroeconomic consequences of the Dutch Disease 
will depend on the country economic structure and the stage of development, hence will 
vary from country to country. A country where a manufacturing sector does barely exist 
or where the non-oil primary sector is structurally deficient as it has been the case of 
Equatorial Guinea; there is little to fear about the disease. In that context the oil boom 
become a blessing, given that oil revenues when properly managed, can play a special 
and critical role in overall economic development and poverty reduction in low-income 
countries like Equatorial Guinea. Although the GDP per capita has substantially 
increased from US$ 346 in 1995 to US$ 3391 in 2004 due to the coming on stream of 
important oil fields, EQG remains among the poorest country by the standard of living 
conditions and the level of development.  
 






























            Sources: Equato-Guinean authorities Bank and Fund staff estimates. 
 
  Considering the pattern of EQG traditional agriculture and export sectors before 
the coming on stream of important oil fields in 1996, the sector was already in decline 
despite the government’s efforts. Cocoa, coffee and timber have traditionally been the 
country’s main source of income. During the early period of independence, Equatorial 
Guinea experienced a drastic economic decline; GDP per capita in current terms fell 
  17sharply, from US$ 260 in 1970 to about US$ 170 in 1979, mainly because of the severe 
decline of the country’s agricultural production.  
 
  As already mentioned the cocoa sector has been deficient, long before the coming 
on stream of important oil field and subsequent oil-revenues. Cocoa exports fell from 
nearly 40,000 tons in 1968 to less than 20,000 tons at the beginning of the 1970s, 
following the departure of the foreign plantation owners and to about 7,000 tons a year 
after the exodus of some 30,000-40,000 Nigerian contract workers in the mid-1970s. 
Decline in the other agricultural sectors was equally striking; timber production declined 
from 360,000 cubic meters in 1968 to an annual average of 6,000 cubic meters in the late 
1970s, and coffee and palm-oil production virtually disappeared. Since then the sector 
has barely recovered, on the contrary, the labor’s shortage remains persistent combined 
with the real effective exchange rate appreciation and the magnitude of oil resource, the 
very small traditional export sector seems not to be viable. 
 
  In addition Equatorial Guinea is a tiny country of 28,000 km
2 with a relatively 
small population estimated at about 506,000 inhabitants, therefore the traditional export 
sector cannot be significantly expanded
26 and the country does not have any specific 
comparative advantage in the traditional export sector. Continual mobilization of 
resources in the sector is costly because of the poor marginal return the sector can yield 
and in the same time it deprives the economy of critical resources needed to develop 
other strategic sectors, therefore constitutes a waste of resources. The traditional export 
sector will probably disappear due to the necessary ongoing reallocation of resources 
within the economy. The traditional export sector could then be substituted by the 
emergence of a competitive food production sector to warrant food security and limit the 
dependency on imported foods. 
 
Equatorial Guinea: Imports of Goods and Services 



















                            Source: Equatorial Guinean authorities Bank staff and IMF.  
 
Natural resource endowment is a blessing if well utilized, to escape the poverty 
trap and a sound resource-led development strategy can make a difference, therefore it is 
                                                 
26 Although the country can import labor; however the strategy consisting of importing labor has always 
been the main flaw of the system and likely to increasingly be the case given the new oil-based economy 
and its spillover effects.   
  18important to understand the dynamic of structural changes that typically occur along with 
large-scale mineral production. In the context of an oil boom the structure of the 
economy is fundamentally transformed; these changes, together with the revenues from 
oil exports, could set the stage for a sustained growth and economic development. Before 
the large-scale oil production, Equatorial Guinea was among the poorest countries in the 
world, with a very weak economy; without oil production, the country future would have 
been extremely bleak




  It is critically important for Equatorial Guinea authorities to reorient their 
resources and development efforts where the country could have proven comparative 
advantage; for example tourism and to develop other export niches and sectors of the 
economy which can generate as much as foreign exchange earnings than the traditional 
export sector. Food constitutes by far the largest single item of household consumption in 
general. Oil proceeds can also be invested in raising the productivity of farmers by 
financing improved seed variety for local production to support the transition from the 
traditional agricultural export sector to increase local food production. The tertiary sector 
globally needs the government’s attention toward a service based economy supported by 
oil-revenues during the transitional period. This backdrop does not mean than the 
manufacturing sector should not exist on the contrary, the new-economy in the making 
will demand a different type of industries and manufacturing alongside the service based 
economy.  
 
  The Dutch Disease is a matter of concern mainly if the oil windfalls are used to 
finance private consumption rather than investment. In that case, the non-oil traded sector 
might well be squeezed on a sustained basis, with adverse consequences for long-term 
growth; it is very unlikely if the oil proceeds are properly used for public investments in 
an economy largely in need of basic infrastructure as is the case of Equatorial Guinea. 
Given the volatility of world oil prices and the depletion of oil over time, considerable 
care must be given to managing the large macroeconomic risks of oil income flows, as 
well as to spread the benefits of the oil earnings across generations through, mostly, long-
lasting financial, physical, and human capital. 
 
                                                 
27 The country like many SSA countries was not creditworthy, and therefore could not borrow the needed 
investment funding from private capital markets for public investments, in additional the economy was not 
able to generate substantial income; in other word the country was in a poverty trap. Oil proceeds in 
principle allow countries to break out of the poverty trap. 
28 The proceeds of the oil revenues should equally be invested in economic and social infrastructure that 
raises productivity of workers both in traded and not traded-sector for example in roads, power, telecoms, 
health and education. 
  19Equatorial Guinea: Overall Balance - Cash Basis -  2002 - 2006 






























Overall Balance (cash basis)
 
   Sources: Equatorial Guinean authorities Bank staff and IMF. 
 
  Another well-known issue of resource-rich economies is volatility, known as 
boom and bust cycles, which can equally have negative impact on economic growth. This 
phenomenon plagues oil exporter
29 countries, given the importance of oil in the overall 
economy and in government revenues. The economic impact includes unpredictable 
revenue streams because widely fluctuating export revenues lead to fluctuating levels in 
overall government revenues (Mikesell 1997). These frequent upward or downward 
adjustments of fiscal expenditures are costly because they simultaneously discourage 
private investment and destabilize the government’s budget, therefore impeding its ability 
to sustain investment and social provision and service deliveries (Katz et al. 2004). In 
addition, once expenditures become entrenched, it is harder for governments to make 
budget cuts; rather than reversing their spending patterns during busts, they often opt to 
borrow, and hence, risk incurring huge debt burdens.    
 
  A country with large revenues derived from exploiting a nonrenewable resource 
such as oil, typically faces two main problems: (i) the revenue stream is uncertain and 
volatile because it depends on the world oil prices, and (ii) that revenue will eventually 
dry up. Nonrenewable Resource Funds (NRFs) are proposed to deal with both problems. 
First, a fund may be seen as able to stabilize budgetary revenues. When oil price is high, 
the fund would receive excess resources, which would then allocate to the budget when 
the price is low and therefore revenues. Second, a fund may be seen as a way to save 
some of the revenue generated by exploiting the finite stock of the resource, which can 
then provide income after it has been depleted. Funds may also be set up for other 
reasons such as to counteract the spending effect leading to the real exchange rate 
volatility and Dutch Disease, for liquidity and political economy purposes, and to 
enhance governance and transparency (Jeffrey Davis et al. 2001). 
 
  Norway, for example, has charted a long-run-oriented, tax-based and reasonably 
market friendly approach to the management of its oil resources. The oil revenue is 
deposited in the Norwegian Petroleum Fund, which is being built up and invested mostly 
in foreign securities for the benefit of the current generation of Norwegians when the 
reach old age as well as for the future generations, and also in order to shield the 
                                                 
29 Although market volatility is a problem for all exporters of primary commodities, the phenomena is acute 
for oil exporting countries given the importance of oil in the overall economy. 
  20domestic economy from overheating and possible waste. At the same time, however, a 
variable proportion of each year’s net oil-tax revenue is transferred from the 




  The Azerbaijan Republic also established an Oil fund. The State Oil Fund of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) was established in 1999 as an extra-budgetary 
institution. Its main objective is the management of oil and gas related revenues for the 
benefit of the country and its future generations. SOFAZ receives all government 
revenues associates with the post-Soviet oil and gas production fields. This oil fund has 
no immediate stabilization objective and net flows are not related to the oil prices level or 
a budgetary position. On the outflow side, Azerbaijan’s oil fund rules currently prohibit 
spending in excess of inflows in any given year. A conservative expenditure policy has 
ensured a steady growth of savings in the fund. Asset management regulations require 
that financial asserts be kept offshore at highly rated banks. The fund is not permitted to 




  In order to reduce political pressures to spend windfall oil revenues rapidly, the 
government established the oil fund under direct Presidential control. The members of 
SOFAZ’s supervisory board are appointed by the President of Azerbaijan. An 
independent auditor conducts an annual audit of the fund, and the audit report is made 
public. SOFAZ reports quarterly in the press on total inflows received, expenditure, and 
interest earned. To strengthen the legislative foundation of SOFAZ, its budget and asset 
management rules were approved by Parliament in June 2003 as amendments to the 
Budget System Law. The Creation of an oil fund in Azerbaijan has had a positive impact 
on fiscal discipline and contributed to better transparency and accountability of oil 
revenue management. 
 
  Jeffrey Davis et al in 2001 assessed the effectiveness of NRFs, by using both 
econometric evidence and country case studies; limitation on the availability and quality 
of the data, and the small sample, warrant caution in interpreting the results. The 
econometric evidence suggests that in some countries with NRFs, expenditure has tended 
to be less correlated with changes in nonresource export earnings than in those without 
funds, although this experience is not uniform. It also indicates, however that for 
countries with NRFs the establishment of a fund did not have an identifiable impact on 
government spending.  
 
  This finding may suggest that countries with more prudent expenditure policies 
tended to establish a NRF, rather than the NRF itself leading to increased expenditure 
restraint. It could, however, be argued that the establishment of a fund may have helped 
to maintain cautious policies in the context of ongoing revenue variability. In other hand, 
country experience suggests that the behavior of prices and the issue of fungibility pose 
                                                 
30 Thorvadur Gylfason. The Paradox of Plenty – For the Statoil-Econ conference volume – Lessons from 
the Dutch Disease: Causes, Treatment, and Cures. March 2001. 
31 Managing the Oil Wealth: The Case of Azerbaijan. International Monetary Fund, 2004. 
  21substantial problems for the operation of the NRFs. In several cases, the integration of the 
fund’s operation with overall fiscal policy has proven problematic, and despite the 
operation of a fund, the stabilization of expenditure has been elusive. Moreover, there is 
evidence that funds may have been most difficult to operate when the extent of reliance 
on windfall has been important. 
 





















                      Source: Equatorial Guinea Authorities and Bank’s staff and IMF. 
  
  Overall, natural resource endowment if well managed is a blessing rather than a 
curse for low-income countries to escape the poverty trap and a sound resource-led 
development strategy could make a difference. However a volatile and uncertain fiscal 
revenue source renders fiscal management, budgetary planning, and the efficient use of 
public resources difficult. This is the case particularly when it makes up a large share of 
total revenue as it is the case of Equatorial Guinea and suggests that the country should 
constantly follow a strict fiscal discipline to better manage increasing surpluses while 
promoting the development process. Hence it is critical to assess the policies, institutions 
and capacity for the management of Equatorial Guinea’s oil dominated economy.  
 
 
  22V.  Assessment of the Oil Wealth Governance and the Country’s 
PFM – Institutional Arrangements   
 
  The phenomenon of Dutch Disease and boom and bust cycles are not the only 
mechanisms whereby economic growth is negatively affected by windfalls; probably, and 
almost equally important are the incentives that windfalls create for unproductive 
investments, rent-seeking and corruption. Many scholars and development practitioners 
argue that, because windfall rents are concentrated and easily obtained; they exert 
pressure to engage in rent-seeking, corruption and governments to share increased 
revenues with the public, often by investing in unproductive public work project or 
subsidizing food, fuel failing industries and even government jobs (Auty 1990); Gelb et 
al 1988) and (McMahon 1997). Therefore it is important to assess the oil wealth 
governance and PFM Institutional arrangements to increase transparency and 
accountability.  
A - Assessment of the Oil Wealth Governance  
 
  Since the onset of oil production in 1995, the hydrocarbon sector has been the 
engine of growth. The production has increased from 6,000 barrels a day to 282,000 
barrels a day in 2003, supporting an average annual GDP growth of 31 percent. The 
production subsequently reached a milestone of 400,000 barrels a day in 2005 and 
accounted for over 90 percent of government revenues. This wealth is yet to be 
transformed in living conditions and poverty reduction, despite an increase in per capita 
GDP from US$346 in 1995 to about US$3391 in 2004, with a relative small population 
estimated at 506,000
32 inhabitants in 2004. A comprehensive medium-term strategy for 
managing the country’s rapidly rising oil wealth is required to ensure that the large oil 
endowment relatively to the size of the population is being translated into benefits for the 
poor. To promote good governance in the management of the country’s oil wealth, the 
government may wish to adhere to clear standards of accountability and transparency; 
especially by complying with the EITI. 
 
  Equatorial Guinea is currently the only African oil-producing country where oil 
revenue clearly exceeds the country’s absorptive capacity and where sizable foreign 
assets have been accumulated (Katz et al. 2004). The widespread poverty and low human 
indicators in Equatorial Guinea argue for upgrading domestic infrastructure and 
increasing public services so as to improve the quality and productivity of physical and 
human capital. Investment in financial assets would build the reserves needed to 
gradually increase capital investment as absorptive capacity grows. The current fiscal 
rule, which the government is trying to follow, is to use non-oil revenue to finance 
current expenditures and oil revenue to finance capital expenditure, and to save what is 
left. 
 
                                                 
32 World Development Indicator Report (WDI) - The World Bank 2005. 
  23  Until 2001, when hydrocarbon revenue was first incorporated into the budget, 
fiscal surplus was held in treasury investment accounts abroad. The realism and accuracy 
of oil revenue projections improved with the revised budget for 2002, submitted to 
parliament in May 2002. As of that date the previous practice of extra-budgetary 
expenditure using advances from oil companies, has been discontinued. Equatorial 
Guinea now has a rule that allows hydrocarbon revenue to be used only to finance public 
investment. At present, the government holds the bulk of its foreign reserves in the 
regional central bank, BEAC. However, Equatorial Guinea authorities maintain foreign 
exchange accounts abroad, only the President has access to these accounts
33.  
 


































                    Sources: Equatorial Guinea Authorities and IMF. 
 
Authorities established a government-owned oil company as the National Oil 
Company of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (GEPETROL), by Presidential Decree in 
February 2001, and the company became operational in 2002. The company was founded 
to improve the government’s overall receipts through the negotiation of contracts, 
commercialization of royalties that are received in kind, and participation in production 
activities. Despite the limited capacity of the firm, so far negotiation of some contracts 
has been conducted, and the sale of some royalties received in kind has been tendered to 
commercial traders. The Ministry of Mines and Energy regulates and supervises 
GEPETROL, and the enterprise is instructed to use only government accounts for the 
deposit of revenue from activities. 
 
  GEPETROL manages the state’s participation as a shareholder and other rights 
and obligation in Petroleum contracts; acts as agent for the sales of the state’s share of 
Hydrocarbons. It is equally the state’s agent for licensing open acreage within Equatorial 
Guinea. GEPETROL is mandated to participate in commercial ventures, either solely or 
as a partner with other national or foreign companies, within Equatorial Guinea or 
abroad. GEPETROL interacts with the Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy on a 
regular basis to co-ordinate the affairs of the petroleum sector in Equatorial Guinea. The 
Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy is the overall regulatory and administrative body 
                                                 
33 The Government was considering in late 2006 the possibility of managing its hydrocarbon revenue 
through two funds: the Fund for Future Generations and the Special Reserve Fund. 
  24for the petroleum industry in Equatorial Guinea. GEPETROL also participates in general 
commercial ventures that enhance economic development of Equatorial Guinea. 
 
  Based on Equatorial Guinea’s hydrocarbons law the petroleum sector legal 
framework is transparent and precise vis-à-vis oil companies operating in Equatorial 
Guinea. The article 16 provides that the contractor shall at all times maintain at its offices 
in Equatorial Guinea the original records and books of Petroleum Operations in 
accordance with all applicable regulations and the accounting procedure. They shall be 
supported by detailed documents demonstrating the expenses and receipts of the 
Contractor. Such records and books shall be used to determine the Contractor’s gross 
revenues, petroleum operations costs and nets profits as well as to establish the 
Contractor’s income tax and other payment obligations. These record and books should 
also include accounts showing sales of hydrocarbons. 
 
  The production sharing contract element derived from the hydrocarbon law 
provides that the Ministry, after notifying the Contractor, may have experts of its choice 
or its own agents examine and audit any records and book relating to petroleum 
operations. The Ministry has a period of three years from the date the Contractor submits 
to the Ministry records and books in accordance with Article 16.2, to perform such 
examinations or audit with respect to the said calendar year and submit its objections to 
the Contractor for any contradictions or errors found during such examination or audits.  
 
  The government has recently stepped up the audit of oil companies’ financial 
statements and improved other aspect of managing oil-related transactions. Based on the 
audits that cover selected oil companies’ activities during 1996-2001, the companies have 
recognized their obligation to pay an additional US$88
34 millions, about 3 percent of 
GDP to the government. 
 
  The government operates under simple fiscal rules. The main rule follow by 
Equatorial Guinea authorities is that current expenditures are to be funded only from non-
oil revenues. However this rule has not been effectively observed in recent years, and 
current expenditure in the 2005 budget exceeds non-oil revenue by more than 40 percent, 
and was covered through oil proceeds. This practice follows the Norwegian Petroleum 
Fund model, where a variable proportion of each year’s net oil-tax revenue is transferred 
from the government’s Petroleum Fund to the fiscal budget, essentially to cover the non-
oil budget deficit.  
 
  Equatorial Guinea authorities have created a Fund for Future Generations (FFG) 
and committed to allocate 0.5 percent of oil revenues into the dedicated fund held at the 
BEAC. Furthermore the FFG it is clearly stated in the financing component of the budget 
document and has been adhered to in the recent years.  
 
  Equatorial Guinea revenues are collected by the Treasury in its BEAC and 
commercial bank accounts, through five commercial bank accounts, of which two are 
                                                 
34 IMF Country Report No. 03/385, December 2003 – Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 2003 Article IV 
Consultation, Staff report. 
  25dollar accounts for receipt of oil revenues. Non-tax payments from oil companies are 
made directly into a Treasury account at the BEAC by the oil companies or GEPetrol 
acting as an agent of the government, and inform the MMIE. Tax revenues both oil and 
non-oil are collected through Treasury accounts in the commercial banks which are 
reconciled every day by Treasury.   
 
  Although these processes have been clearly defined in principle, there are several 
practical reconciliation problems between the BEAC, Treasury, and executing agencies in 
respect particularly to tax and non tax oil revenues. As oil companies only inform the 
executing agencies (Tax Directorate and MMIE) about their payments, both the BEAC 
and the Treasury have difficulties identifying the nature of the payment and how they 
should therefore account for. This lack of effective coordination between the executing 
and collecting agencies also means that executing agencies can face difficulties in 
assessing compliance with Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) and tax obligation by oil 
companies. To address this problem, the government has recently set-up a working group 
of Treasury, Tax Directorate, and MMIE officials to put in place and implement better 
coordination procedures. 
 
   Equatorial Guinea has been steadily putting in place the basis for a transparent 
management of its oil wealth however, more remains to be done. General principles are 
in place; nonetheless, the exhaustively of oil revenues accruing to the government 
remains unknown as the information is not publicly available. Adherence to the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as agreed at the EITI London 
Conference in March 2005 would be an important milestone. Successful implementation 
of the EITI requires countries to meet, or exceed the agreed criteria which rest on six 
guiding principles:  
 
•  Publication of payments and receipts in a publicly and readily accessible form;  
 
•  Independent audit of payments and receipts by reputable audit firm applying 
international auditing standards;  
 
•  Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator, 
with publication of the administrator opinion regarding that reconciliation;  
 
•  Extension of the above to all companies including national resources companies;  
 
•  Active engagement of civil society in the design, monitoring, and public debate 
around the implementation process, and finally;  
 
•  Commitment to a work plan and timeline for implementation.  
The timely and newly EITI++ initiative recently launched by the Bank on April 
12, 2008 to help developing countries, particularly African Countries, manage and 
transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads the 
benefits more fairly among their people is the perfect framework for Equatorial Guinea. 
  26The EITI++ further to improving transparency and accountability will rightly focus on 
the resource chain including managing revenues, and promoting sustainable and efficient 
utilization of resource wealth. It will provide governments with a slate of options 
including technical assistance and capacity building for improving the management of 
resource-related wealth for the benefit of the poor and notably the implementation of 
good policies.  
Ensuring that the large Equatorial Guinea’s oil endowment relatively to the size of 
the population is being translated into economic opportunities and benefices for the 
overall economy requires the assessment of the Budget formulation and execution; given 
that Equatorial Guinea oil-revenue are integrated into the budget
35 and particularly into 
the capital budget and partly in the current budget
36 therefore, the quality of budget 
execution matters for poverty reduction. However, the quality of budget execution 
depends on the quality of budget preparation or formulation.  
 
B - Assessment of the Budget Formulation Framework 
 
  The budget is the main vehicle and active instrument in hands of the government 
to support its development strategy and poverty reduction through efficient allocation of 
resources to put in motion the medium-term development vision. The immediate 
challenge facing the Equato-Guinean authorities is to prepare a comprehensive 
development strategy to reduce poverty and foster broad-based economic growth. A well 
formulated and prioritarized budget is critical in this regard. With the substantial oil 
wealth, Equatorial Guinea should be able to make rapid progress toward achieving the 
MDGs. 
 
  The lack of a clearly stated medium-term development and poverty reduction 
strategy affects both resource allocation and performance. The budget document includes 
only very general statements about poverty reduction and infrastructural development 
objectives, and does not relate them explicitly to resource allocation in the budget 
proposal. Until 2001, the basic medium-term policy statement was the Medium-Term 
Economic Strategy 1997-2001 document. Currently, neither the current budget nor the 
investment budget or its associated Public Investment Program (PIP) can be assessed in 
term of specific policy priorities or objectives (IMF 2006). 
 
  Based on the Public Finance Law, the Budget Directorate in the Ministry of 
Finance and Budget (MFB) has overall responsibility for the preparation of the budget. 
The investment budget however, is based on the PIP prepared by the Ministry of 
Planning and Development (MPD), broadly in parallel with the current budget, but 
without any explicit links between investment and consequent recurrent cost. The 
                                                 
35 That justifies why there is a profound need for a sound Public Finance Management (PFM), if windfalls 
are to be translated into growth and durable poverty reduction; and because in principle, the budget is the 
very policy instrument through which the government expresses its priorities and policy actions. 
36 The absorptive capacity should then be carefully assessed and adequately dealt with furthermore, excess 
proceeds from windfalls should be invested in financial assets. 
  27Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy (MMIE) along with GEPetrol play a key role in 
the programming and forecasting of oil revenues. 
 
  Budget preparation for recurrent expenditure starts in late March when the Budget 
Directorate sends ministries procedural instruction for the drafting of their budget 
proposal for the coming fiscal year under 45 days dateline for submission. In this process, 
the Budget Directorate acknowledges expenditure allocation in the previous budget as a 
baseline, and ministries only need to justify proposed expenditure increases. In June, 
ministries meet in individual negotiations with the MFB to discuss their proposal only on 
deviations from the baseline. All proposals are then consolidated by the Budget 
Directorate and sent to the council of Ministers in August, where remaining disagreement 
are discussed and Ministers can raise new expenditure claims and disagreements are 
settled by the Prime Minister, or ultimately by the President. 
 
  Preparation of the investment budget follows a parallel path with no significant 
overall involment of the MFB. A three-year rolling PIP is prepared without an explicit 
ceiling from the MFB for the coming fiscal year. Line ministries prepare and present their 
investment project to the MPD, where they are evaluated and, eventually, included in the 
PIP. Once the MPD has aggregated all approved investment projects, it sends the PIP to 
the Budget Directorate, where the first year is included as the investment budget and sent 
to the Council of Ministers for discussion, without questioning the overall level of 
investment, the priorities it expresses, or its medium-term financial implication. If it has 
not been received on time, the Budget Directorate sends its own estimation to the council 
of Ministers. At this stage, Ministers can still make new claim on resources on which the 
President holds the final decision. Once approved by the Council of Ministers and the 
President, the investment budget is incorporated into the budget bill by the budget 
Directorate as a single global appropriation. 
 
  The Budget Directorate has no significant role in revenue forecasts. Oil revenue 
forecasts are prepared by the MMIE, non-oil tax revenue forecasts are prepared by the 
Tax and Customs Directorates, and other minor revenue flows, such as administrative 
fees charged by ministries and government departments for state services, are projected 
by concerned institutions as part of the process of preparing the recurrent expenditure 
comportment of the budget. The Budget Directorate collects all these forecasts and 
incorporates them into the proposal that is submitted to the Council of Ministers and the 
President for approval.  
 
  Once the Council of Ministers and the President ratify each comportment of the 
budget, the Budget Directorate sends the draft law to parliament before the end of August 
for discussion in the September session, If the budget law is not enacted by parliament 
before the beginning of the budget year, the government operates on the basis of the 
previous year’s budget until parliament convenes again in March, when an Amendment 
Budget Law is proposed to parliament.  
 
  Fiscal administration is dominated by the executive branch of government, with 
inherent dangers of over-centralization and inadequate checks and balances. 
  28Parliamentary oversight of the budget needs to be progressively strengthened. Although 
the public finance law establishes the right of parliament to any information required to 
exercise this function, and requires the MFB to send a quarterly budget execution report 
to parliament; however, after discussing the annual budget law, the parliament is 
dissolved for six months and therefore plays a limited role either in authorizing changes 
to budget implementation or in scrutiny of the final account. It is noteworthy to mention 
that Parliamentary review of budget execution is consolidated with the passing of budget 
law in the September section; the budget execution report being a pre-requisite for 
passage of the following year’s budget law. While this process ensures timely reporting 
of budget execution, it does not allow sufficient time for parliamentary scrutiny and an 
effective independent audit process; this leads us the budget execution assessment. 
 
C - Budget Execution and Monitoring Assessment 
 
  The annual budget law comes into effect on January 1, following the approval by 
parliament and the President in October, for the calendar year ahead. The Public Finance 
Law defines various responsibilities in the budget execution process for spending 
agencies and ministries, the MFB, the different directorates of this ministry, and the Head 
of State or his delegate as Ordenador. The law also provides for a significant number of 
exceptions to the general norms. 
 
  The normal spending process
37 starts with ministries and agencies making claims 
for resources to the MFB, where the Directorate of Financial Control verifies the 
existence of appropriations for the expense in the budget. If appropriations are available, 
the MFB sends the payment claim for approval to the Ordenador Principal (President) if 
it exceeds 1 million CFA or to the Ordenador Secundario (Prime Minister) if it does not 
reach this threshold. If the expense is approved at this stage, the payment order is sent to 
the Treasury, where the funds are released by check directly to the payee designated by 
the ministry or agency responsible for the expenditure and the expenditure is recorded on 
cash basis by the Treasury and informed the Budget Directorate. It goes without seeing 
that the budget execution or more precisely the expenditure process needs to be 
strengthened and better codified, and more so regarding control at the commitments level. 
 
  In the context of the lack of control at the level of commitments, it is common for 
payment claims to be made for commitments incurred by ministries or agencies for which 
there is insufficient or no appropriation
38. In such cases, if the activity is deemed of high 
priority or it has already been contracted for, it is common for spending to be authorized 
on the basis of supplementary legislative or administrative procedures. According to the 
Public Finance Law, legislative approval should be obtained in such cases before the 
funds are drawn. Given that the parliament convenes only twice a year, the common 
                                                 
37 Republic of Equatorial Guinea: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Fiscal Transparency 
Module. The IMF Country Report No. 05/144 April 2005. 
38 There is a need to bring this practice to an end, because it leads to misuse and waste of public funds 
given the weak existing control system and does not respect the integrity of the budget.  
  29practice is to wait only for administrative approval of the expense and obtain 
parliamentary approval on an ex-post basis.  
 
  The Public Finance Law and the annual budget law also provide for 
administrative flexibility in expenditure management. The Council of Ministers can 
transfer appropriation through a decree that is ratified ex-post by parliament. Although 
the law requires allocation to be made at the level of chapters and specific spending units, 
it also authorizes global appropriations for expenditures that arise from unforeseen 
circumstance or could not be specifically allocated during the budget preparation process, 
and authorizes the Minister of Finance to allocate these resources during the fiscal year. 
The size of these appropriations apparently as a contingency reserve, have no explicit 
legal limitation. 
 
  The execution of investment projects is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Infrastructure (MOI) and the MPD is responsible for overall coordination and oversight 
of the PIP. None of these institutions, however, have procedures in place, nor capabilities 
for monitoring commitments as to facilitate effective oversight and control of investment 
projects. This has contributed to significant expenditure overruns in the investment 
budget in recent years, which constitutes a waste of resources. 
  
  Financial control largely functions on an ex-ante basis. The Directorate of 
Financial Control in the MFB preauthorizes payments on the basis of existing 
appropriations, but final payment authorizations lie with the Prime Minister or the Head 
of State, depending on the value of each payment. The ex-ante financial control system 
was introduced because of concerns with payments control and potential misuse of funds. 
The Directorate of Finance Control is also nominally responsible for ex-post auditing of 
the budget execution. However, once payments are released and made, no systemic 
mechanisms have been established for public managers to account for resources and for 
internal review of payments and implementation of procedures.  
 
  The system of centralized and lengthy pre-approval procedure combined with 
weak and uncoordinated ex-post auditing lengthens the process of control over final 
payment and reduces accountability of public managers on budget execution, as well as 
the accountability of the Directorate of Finance Control and the Treasury for payment 
control. It also complicates cash management forecasting and control, and generates 
costly delay in the process of Budget execution  
 
  The Treasury is responsible for fiscal accounting and reporting. It produces 
quarterly execution reports covering all revenues and expenditures of institutions 
included in the budget law and submit them to the budget Directorate. These reports 
follow the budget classification, which defines general categories that can be grouped to 
show the overall balance and non-oil balance. Apart from the information contained in 
the budget execution law and the budget document, there is no legal or statutory 
requirement for the obligation of fiscal data. And quarterly budget execution reports sent 
to the Council of Ministers are not made available to public. 
 
  30  There is no formal mid-year review of the budget, though parliament receives 
preliminary information on budget in the first half of the year. The Standing Committee 
of parliament receives an execution report in or around July, together with any 
rectifications proposed by the government for the current budget; covering revenue and 
expenditure during the first half of the year. Quarterly execution reports are discussed by 
the Council of Ministers but not made public nor sent to parliament. Hence, the 
parliamentary oversight role needs to be strengthened. 
 
  The existing budget execution framework needs to be substantially strengthened 
and subsequently, expenditure process needs to be streamlined and the annual expenses 
fully integrated into the budget law adopted by the parliament without any exception
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for the government to authorize spending which have not been included in the Finance 
Law. There is also a pressing need to undertake the preparation of a MTEF integrating 
the PIP into the normal budget execution framework and process and to enhance its 
implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, there is a need to improve accountability 
and strengthen the oversight structure for more transparency in the process of budget 
execution. 
VI.  Conclusion   
 
In principle, the Dutch Disease is a matter of one sector benefiting partly at the 
expense of others, therefore not an impediment per se; however the disease is potentially 
harmful if there is something special about the reallocation of resources between sectors; 
for example from high-tech service industries with important spillover effects to low 
primary production. The oil boom would therefore induce a decline in a technologically 
leading sector of the economy with adverse consequence for long-term growth: The 
resource shift can then become a true disease.   
 
The magnitude of negative macroeconomic consequences of the Dutch Disease 
will depend however on the country’s economic structure and the stage of development, 
hence will vary from country to country. A country where a manufacturing sector does 
barely exist or where the non-oil primary sector is structurally deficient as it has been the 
case of Equatorial Guinea; there is little to fear about the disease. In that context the oil 
boom become a blessing rather than a curse, given that oil revenues when properly 
managed, can play a special and critical role in overall economic development and 
poverty reduction in low-income countries like Equatorial Guinea. Although the GDP per 
capita has substantially increased from US$ 346 in 1995 to US$ 3391 in 2004 due to the 
coming on stream of important oil fields, nonetheless, EQG remains among the poorest 
countries by standard of living conditions and the level of development.  
 
It is noteworthy to emphasize that Equatorial Guinea is a tiny country of 28,000 
km
2 with a relatively small population estimated at about 506,000 inhabitants, therefore 
the traditional export sector cannot be expanded and the country does not have any 
                                                 
39 The rule should be to fully integrate annual government expenditure into the budget and safeguard the 
budget’s integrity, to avoid misuse of public funds in the context of weak internal control and weak 
accountability. 
  31specific comparative advantage in the traditional export sector. Continual mobilization of 
resources in the sector is costly because of the poor marginal return the sector can yield 
and at the same time it deprives the economy of critical resources needed to develop 
other strategic sectors; therefore it constitutes a waste of resources. The traditional export 
sector will certainly disappear due to the necessary ongoing reallocation of resources 
within the economy. The sector could then be substituted by the emergence of a 
competitive food production sector to warrant food security and limit the dependency on 
imported foods. 
 
It is critically important for Equatorial Guinea authorities to reorient their 
resources and development efforts where the country could have proven comparative 
advantage; for example tourism and to develop other export niches and sectors of the 
economy which can generate as much as foreign exchange earnings than the traditional 
export sector. Food constitutes by far the largest single item of household consumption in 
general. Oil proceeds can be invested in raising the productivity of farmers by financing 
improved seed variety for local production to support the transition from the traditional 
agricultural export sector to increase local food production. The tertiary sector globally 
needs government attention toward a service-based economy supported by oil-revenues 
during the transitional period. This backdrop does not mean than the manufacturing 
sector should not exist on the contrary, the new-economy in the making will demand a 
different type of industries and manufacturing alongside the service based and oil 
dominated economy.  
 
In addition, Equatorial Guinea is currently the only Sub-Sahara African oil-
producing country where oil revenue clearly exceeds the country’s absorptive capacity 
and where sizable foreign assets have been accumulated. The widespread poverty and 
low human indicators in Equatorial Guinea also argue for upgrading domestic 
infrastructure and increasing public services so as to improve the quality and productivity 
of physical and human capital. Investment in financial assets would build the reserves 
needed to gradually increase capital investment as absorptive capacity improves. The 
current fiscal rule, that the government is trying to follow, is to use non-oil revenue to 
finance current expenditures and oil revenue to finance capital expenditure, and to save 
what is left: this rule is prudent, and predictable although not rigorously applied. 
 
Equatorial Guinea authorities have steadily put in place the basis for a transparent 
management of its oil wealth however, more remains to be done. General principles are 
in place; nonetheless, the exhaustively of oil revenues accruing to the government 
remains unknown as the information is not publicly available. Adherence to the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as agreed at the EITI London 
Conference in March 2005 would be an important milestone toward greater transparency 
and efficiency in oil management for poverty reduction. In the same time, authorities 
need to tighten budget execution procedures and internal financial controls to safeguard 
the budget integrity and public resources, and for greater accountability.  
  
Foremost, the timely and newly EITI++ initiative recently launched by the Bank 
on April 12, 2008; to help developing countries, particularly African Countries, manage 
  32  33
and transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads 
the benefits more fairly among their people is the perfect framework for Equatorial 
Guinea. The EITI++ further to improving transparency and accountability will rightly 
focus on the resource chain including managing revenues, and promoting sustainable and 
efficient utilization of resource wealth. It will provide governments with a slate of options 
including technical assistance and capacity building for improving the management of 
resource-related wealth for the benefit of the poor and notably the implementation of 
good policies.  References 
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